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iNtroductioN
The aim of this article is to illustrate how the large repayments of external debts undermine a debtor coun-try’s ability to comply with its obligations under the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR)1 and to argue that adequate debt relief to the poor-
est debtor countries is imperative. First, this article will briefly 
introduce the magnitude and extent of developing countries’ 
external debt problem. Second, it will argue that creditor coun-
tries have human rights obligations beyond their borders to the 
people of debtor countries, based on the states’ legal duty to 
engage in “international cooperation and assistance.” Third, it 
will identify a State Party’s obligations under the ICESCR and 
demonstrate how making huge debt repayments infringe on 
these obligations. Fourth and finally, this article will propose 
that adequate debt relief — in the form of a substantial reduc-
tion of outstanding external debts — be granted to the poorest of 
debtor countries in order to allow them to progressively realize 
the economic, social, and cultural (ESC) rights of their people.
exterNal deBts oWed By deVelopiNG couNtries
The World Bank lists 134 low- and middle-income countries 
that report to its Debtor Reporting System and had outstanding 
arrears in their external debt servicing as of June 2008.2 Out 
of these 134 developing countries, 42 are considered heavily 
indebted poor countries (HIPCs) because their level of indebted-
ness has become unmanageable relative to their capacity to pay.3 
Consequently, they satisfy the criteria of the “HIPC Initiative,” a 
mechanism created and managed by the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank to grant debt relief to HIPCs.4 
The remaining 92 countries have varying levels of external debt 
which, according to the IMF and the World Bank, is “sustain-
able” and therefore ineligible for any debt relief.
Over recent decades, the external debt owed by the develop-
ing countries as a group has increased significantly. Low- and 
middle-income countries’ external debts rose from U.S. $500 
billion in 1980, to U.S. $1 trillion in 1985, and to more than U.S. 
$2 trillion in 2003.5 It increased again to U.S. $3.125 trillion in 
2006.6 Between 2000 and 2005, 29 of the world’s poorest coun-
tries paid around U.S. $15.3 billion to service their combined 
external debts.7 This figure, which roughly translates to about 
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U.S. $210 million in debt repayments every month, represents 
the amount of wealth transferred from these poor countries to 
the developed world. More specifically, however, there is an 
actual human cost behind these seemingly innocuous figures: 
real people and real lives adversely affected by huge debt servic-
ing, including children who had to stop studying because their 
government imposed school fees they could not afford; families 
who reside in makeshift shelters because their government could 
not provide affordable housing; and infants who died because 
the government lacks adequate programs to address malnutrition 
and disease.
“extra-territorial” humaN riGhts oBliGatioNs 
of creditor couNtries for the people of deBtor 
couNtries: the urGeNt Need for deBt relief
It is traditionally asserted that states assume the responsibil-
ity of realizing human rights by ratifying human rights instru-
ments, thus creating a “vertical” relationship between the state 
as the duty-bearer and its people as the rights-holders. However, 
in recent years, scholars have advocated the idea that human 
rights transcend national boundaries.8 They argue that one state 
may be held liable, at least in theory, for human rights violations 
committed in the territory of another. Although still controver-
sial, such a “horizontal” dimension of human rights has since 
gained support from many human rights experts.9
Scholars have attempted to advance this horizontal dimen-
sion in both civil and political rights and ESC rights areas. 
With respect to civil and political rights, scholars Mark Gibney, 
Katarina Tomasevski, and Juns Vested-Hansen argue that states 
that aided and abetted violations of civil and political rights in 
another state do incur “transnational state responsibility.”10 Their 
analysis is confined to violations of civil and political rights, for 
example, when a developed state manufactures and exports arms 
or torture implements to another state, which in turn uses them 
to repress its own people. On the other hand, with respect to 
ESC rights, Asbjorn Eide, the former Special Rapporteur on the 
Right to Food, has argued that “[s]tates have obligations also to 
the peoples of other [s]tates and to the international community 
. . . derived from provisions found within human rights law and 
from a set of principles of international law.”11 In the same vein, 
human rights scholar Sigrun Skogly contends that developed 
states have “transnational human rights obligations” to respect 
the ESC rights of the people of developing countries, citing cus-
tomary international law and ICESCR provisions for support.12
Both Eide13 and Skogly14 expressly recognized that the 
“extraterritorial” obligations of developed countries to respect 
ESC rights in developing countries directly stem from the legal 
duty of international cooperation and assistance. Articles 55 and 
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56 of the UN Charter15 are the most categorical and authoritative 
sources of the duty of international cooperation and assistance 
among states. This duty directs them to effectively cooperate 
with one another in order to achieve the goals set forth in the UN 
Charter, including the realization of human rights. International 
law scholar Louis Sohn argues that Articles 55 and 56 carry the 
force of positive international law and impose clear obligations 
that all UN Member States must fulfill.16 Indeed, states have 
consented to be bound by the duty of international cooperation 
and assistance by ratifying the UN Charter, which according to 
Louis Henkin, “epitomize[s] the principle of consent.”17
In addition to Articles 55 and 56 of the UN Charter, the duty 
of international cooperation and assistance also finds its legal 
basis in several provisions of the ICESCR. First among these is 
the clause “to take steps, individually and through international 
assistance and cooperation, especially economic and techni-
cal” found in Article 2(1).18 The second provision is Article 
11(1) which mandates that States Parties fulfill the “right to an 
adequate standard of living” for their people, while recognizing 
“the essential importance of international co-operation based on 
free consent” to achieve this goal. The last provision is Article 
11(2) which, although concerning the specific “right to be free 
from hunger,” directs States Parties to take steps “individually 
and through international co-operation” to fulfill this right. 
Interpreting the duty of international cooperation and assis-
tance, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(CESCR), the body of independent experts that monitors the 
implementation of the ICESCR by its States Parties,19 stated,
In accordance with Articles 55 and 56, . . . with well-
established principles of international law, and with the 
provisions of the [ICESCR] itself, international coop-
eration for development and thus for the realization of 
economic, social and cultural rights is an obligation of 
all States. It is particularly incumbent upon those States 
which are in a position to assist others in this regard.20 
Human rights commentator Stephen Marks places heavy sig-
nificance on the Article 2(1) duty “to take steps, individually and 
through international assistance and cooperation” as providing a 
legal basis for reciprocal obligations between and among States 
Parties to the ICESCR.21 According to Marks, this duty provides 
the ICESCR a “horizontal” dimension which presupposes the 
existence of an obligation among the States Parties inter se, as 
opposed to a mere “vertical” dimension that involves obligations 
owed by a State Party to its own population. Marks argues that 
each State Party has legal obligations “not only to alter its inter-
nal policy but also to act through international cooperation and 
assistance toward the same end.”22
In the context of the external debt problem, creditor coun-
tries’ extraterritorial human rights obligations imply that they 
are legally bound to ensure that their debt-related policies do 
not adversely affect the fulfillment of human rights in debtor 
countries. On this point, Skogly argues that creditor countries 
“are obliged to consider how individual projects, programs, 
and policies may affect the population in the countries where 
they are to be implemented and to alter them when necessary to 
avoid possible human rights violations.”23 Speaking generally 
about the monetary policies being pursued by creditor countries, 
Sanjay Reddy similarly argues that “substantial external effects 
of monetary decisions can generate obligations to take into 
account the concerns of non-citizens or justify claims on the part 
of non-citizens that they be consulted about, or included in the 
making of, the decisions.”24
What is expected, therefore, is prudence and foresight by the 
creditor countries to ensure that their actions with transnational 
ramifications do not undermine or frustrate efforts of debtor 
countries towards ESC rights realization. Before engaging in 
an activity or adopting a policy that has transnational ramifica-
tions, creditor countries must exercise due diligence and defer or 
discontinue a policy if there are reasonable grounds to suspect 
that it will bring adverse consequences to the debtor countries. 
Map of public debt as a percentage of GDP in countries around the world.
4
Creditor countries’ hardened insistence on continued debt repay-
ments, which weaken a debtor country’s ability to fulfill its 
ICESCR obligations to its people, as the next section will dem-
onstrate, must be subjected to this due diligence requirement.
article 2(1) of the icescr aNd  
“proGressiVe realizatioN” of esc riGhts
Under the ICESCR, States Parties are not expected to imme-
diately bring about the full realization of the rights recognized 
therein. Instead, they may realize these rights step-by-step and 
over a period of time. This is the essence of the CESCR’s notion 
of “progressive realization.”25 The language of Article 2(1) 
reflects both the utopian goal of full realization and the harsh 
reality of resource constraints.26
Article 2(1) has been described as the lynchpin of the obli-
gations of States Parties to the ICESCR.27 Notwithstanding 
its phraseology and claims to the contrary,28 Article 2(1) does 
not imply that States Parties do not have immediate obliga-
tions towards full realization. Rather, the Limburg Principles 
on the Implementation of the ICESCR (Limburg Principles), 
a set of interpretative guidelines on the implementation of the 
Covenant,29 proscribe States Parties from indefinitely delaying 
the full realization of ESC rights and require their realization as 
expeditiously as possible.30
This obligation is further bolstered by General Comment 
No. 3, which identifies two immediate obligations on the state 
despite resource constraints: (1) the “undertaking to guarantee” 
that the relevant rights “will be exercised without discrimina-
tion;” and (2) the undertaking “to take steps . . . to the maximum 
of available resources.” Further, the CESCR holds that the latter 
obligation cannot be delayed because it “in itself, is not qualified 
or limited by other considerations.”31
Three separate and distinct obligations spring from Article 
2(1) of the ICESCR: (1) to use “maximum available resources” 
towards the realization of ESC rights; (2) to immediately fulfill 
“minimum core requirements” of each right; and (3) not to 
retrogress in their realization, which would constitute a prima 
facie violation of the ICESCR. The following sub-sections will 
discuss how debt servicing negatively impacts each of these 
obligations.
DeBt seRvicing anD tHe OBligatiOn tO DevOte  
tHe “maximum Of availaBle ResOuRces”
The obligation to devote the maximum available resources to 
the realization of ESC rights is expressly provided for by Article 
2(1) of the ICESCR. However, the question is whether States 
Parties infringe on this obligation by prioritizing debt repayments 
over social expenditures that promote ESC rights. Analysis of 
this issue depends on whether the amounts allocated to States 
Parties’ debt repayments are part of their “available resources” 
within the intent of Article 2(1). If so, the question remains 
whether States Parties have absolute discretion over how they 
should allocate their available resources, or whether allocation 
of available resources is subject to review under the ICESCR.
The first step requires a determination of what constitutes 
“available resources” as intended by the ICESCR drafters. 
Human rights scholars Philip Alston and Gerard Quinn went 
back to the ICESCR’s travaux preparatoires to conclude that the 
term “available resources” should be interpreted in its broad-
est sense.32 They found general agreement among the drafters 
that available resources should include both available national 
and international resources.33 Likewise, the Limburg Principles 
understood the phrase “its available resources” as referring to 
both state resources and “those available from the international 
community through international co-operation and assistance.”34 
Moreover, the CESCR ascribes the same meaning to the phrase 
“the maximum of its available resources” as that adopted by the 
Limburg Principles.35
Some argue, to the contrary, that the money an indebted 
country owes another country or international organization is 
ICESCR States Parties (dark), signatories (lighter), and non-signatories (lightest) around the world.
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a resource not to be included in the “maximum of its available 
resources” meant for the full realization of ICESCR rights.36 
Implicit in this argument is the claim that a State Party is as 
much under a legal obligation to respect its financial agreements, 
such as loan contracts, with other countries as its obligations 
under the ICESCR. Writing on the human rights obligations of 
international organizations, Sabine Michalowski argues that this 
position ignores that contractual obligations do not necessarily 
mean that “funds . . . are therefore not at the free disposition of 
the debtor” and thus available for its use.37 In the same vein, Eric 
Friedman argues that such interpretation of available resources 
would mean that States Parties have a greater duty to meet their 
debt obligations than their obligations to their people.38 This 
“perverse implication,” Friedman argues, makes a mockery of 
the centrality of human rights as enshrined in the UN Charter.39
In his seminal article on “maximum available resources,” 
human rights expert Robert Robertson identifies financial, 
natural, human, technological, and informational resources as 
the most important in achieving ESC rights.40 He first asks 
whether a resource is potentially available for ICESCR use, 
and then determines whether that resource should be available 
for ICESCR use.41 The latter is a more difficult question that 
requires a State Party to make a value judgment.
Regarding what resources are potentially available for 
ICESCR use, Robertson argues that “all domestic resources 
must be considered for use by the state, and all available inter-
national resources must be obtained.”42 According to Robertson, 
because human rights theoretically enjoy priority over all other 
considerations, states should muster all resources needed for 
their satisfaction.43 Robertson cites the reports of Danilo Turk, 
the Special Rapporteur on the Realization of ESC Rights, who 
also suggested a broad interpretation of resource availability 
for the purpose of realizing the rights in the ICESCR.44 Turk 
recognizes not only the need to gather together all domestic and 
international resources but also, and more importantly, the need 
for States Parties to allow the use of private resources to contrib-
ute towards realizing ESC rights.45
Based on the foregoing, government allocations for debt ser-
vicing are part and parcel of a State Party’s available resources. 
Following Robertson’s analysis, one could argue that allocations 
for debt servicing should be first made available for ICESCR 
use. Robertson opines that there are two standards for this 
analysis: one standard is used if there is an extreme deprivation 
of ESC rights in the debtor country, and the second if there is no 
extreme deprivation.
Where there is extreme deprivation — which for Robertson is 
akin to a failure to meet minimum core requirements — a state 
has an obligation “to intrude without limit into both private and 
state resources previously used for other purposes, in order to 
ensure that its population receives ‘core’ entitlements.”46 In this 
situation, amounts allocated for debt servicing like all other state 
resources previously used for other purposes may be diverted and 
channeled to ICESCR expenditures to avoid extreme deprivation.
Where there is no extreme deprivation, Robertson adopts 
the approach of Alston and Quinn who propose to subject the 
States Parties’ determination of their “available resources” to 
a “process requirement by which [they] might be requested to 
show that adequate consideration has been given to the possible 
resources available to satisfy each of the Covenant’s require-
ments, even if the effort was ultimately unsuccessful.”47
If States Parties are expected to seek and pool resources from 
international sources to arrive at “the maximum of its available 
resources,” then there is all the more reason for States Parties 
to look for sources right in their own backyards by reevaluating 
resource allocation to channel more to ICESCR expenditures if 
available resources are found to be insufficient. This reorienta-
tion of national budget priorities is supported by the United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP).48 Rather than allocate 
more than half of spending on military, debt repayments, inef-
ficient state enterprises, and mistargeted social subsidies, the 
UNDP urges governments to restructure their budget allocations 
to prioritize ICESCR expenditures.49
Like military spending, debt repayments are expenditures 
which should take the back seat if they conflict with a State 
Party’s obligations under the ICESCR. This is not to say, how-
ever, that States Parties must completely neglect their military 
and defense requirements or wantonly violate their duty to repay 
under an international loan agreement. Rather, it is incumbent 
upon them, in situations other than where there is extreme depri-
vation, to adequately justify divergence from the priorities set 
by the ICESCR. The Limburg Principles support this point by 
providing that “due priority shall be given to the realization of 
rights recognized in the Covenant, mindful of the need to assure 
to everyone the satisfaction of subsistence requirements as well 
as the provision of essential services.”50 A State Party that fails 
to convincingly justify its divergence from this priority fails to 
comply with its obligation to devote “the maximum of its avail-
able resources” to ESC rights.
A State Party’s decision to allocate its available resources in 
a manner it sees fit, therefore, is reviewable in the light of its 
human rights commitments under the ICESCR. Matthew Craven, 
a commentator on the ICESCR, notes that some members of 
the CESCR have used the ratio between a country’s expendi-
tures on social services and its gross national product (GNP) 
or gross domestic product (GDP) to gauge compliance with the 
Covenant.51 Ultimately, in view of its potential impact on rights 
recognized in the ICESCR, resource allocation is too important a 
matter to be left to the unfettered discretion of States Parties.
DeBt seRvicing anD “minimum cORe OBligatiOns”
While Article 2(1) of the ICESCR does not mention “mini-
mum core obligations,” the term’s invention proved useful in the 
CESCR’s work, specifically in monitoring the performance of 
States Parties.52 Its progenitor is paragraph 25 of the Limburg 
Principles, which provides that States Parties have the respon-
sibility to ensure minimum subsistence rights for everyone, 
regardless of the state’s level of economic development.53 
The CESCR subsequently modified this principle by making 
resource constraints a valid justification for non-compliance.54
The relationship between minimum core obligations and 
minimum essential levels is clear: a State Party must meet a 
minimum core obligation to ensure the minimum essential levels 
of every right in the ICESCR. Each minimum core obligation 
contains the minimum standards a state must comply with to 
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meet its ESC rights obligations.55 Minimum essential levels of 
a right, on the other hand, are defined by Fons Coomans as the 
“essential elements without which a right loses its substantive 
significance as a human right.”56
According to the CESCR, for a State Party to legitimately 
blame the failure to meet its minimum core obligations on the 
lack of available resources, “it must demonstrate that every 
effort has been made to use all resources that are at its disposi-
tion in an effort to satisfy, as a matter of priority, those minimum 
obligations.”57 The Committee’s statement makes the “lack of 
available” resources an exculpatory defense that a State Party 
may plead to justify its failure to perform its minimum core 
obligations. To overcome the prima facie presumption, the bur-
den of proof rests upon the State Party to show that “every effort 
has been made to use all resources . . . to satisfy [those obliga-
tions] as a matter of priority.” This defense is successful only if 
States Parties can prove that, above all other considerations and 
despite all their other commitments, they have chosen to use 
“all resources” to satisfy those obligations. Thus, a State Party 
that prioritized debt servicing in the midst of widespread hun-
ger and disease of its people will not overcome the prima facie 
presumption. This analysis is important because it corresponds 
with the standard that Robertson proposed for determining what 
resources should be made available when people lack minimum 
core entitlements.
There is, however, a different view espoused in the Limburg 
Principle that the minimum core obligations are required of States 
Parties regardless of their level of economic development. In other 
words, lack of resources is not a valid defense for failure to sat-
isfy minimum essential levels of ICESCR rights. The Maastricht 
Guidelines similarly support the view that “[s]uch minimum core 
obligations apply irrespective of the availability of resources of 
the country concerned or any other factors and difficulties.”58
With this different view in mind, there is another way of 
establishing the relationship between debt servicing and a State 
Party’s ability to perform its minimum core obligations under 
the ICESCR. In this approach, the lack of resources is not an 
exculpatory defense but is instead the very reason why a State 
Party fails to ensure the minimum essential levels of ESC 
rights. Massive debt servicing depletes a State Party’s available 
resources, rendering it unable to perform its minimum core 
obligations under the ICESCR. Thus, when an indebted country 
is unable to satisfy the minimum essential ESC rights because 
debt repayments have severely drained its finances, it violates its 
minimum core obligation under the ICESCR.
Satisfying the minimum essential levels of the right to edu-
cation, for example, requires investments in physical infrastruc-
ture, appropriation of salaries for teachers, funds for their con-
tinuous training, and so on. A State Party will find it extremely 
difficult, if not impossible, to fulfill these minimum essential 
levels if debt servicing enjoys the same or even greater priority 
in national budgeting than education expenditures. To illustrate, 
Graph 1 compares the total debt servicing amounts and total 
education expenditures of eight heavily indebted poor countries 
between 2000 and 2005. For comparison with another area of 
ESC rights, Graph 2 shows total debt servicing amounts higher 
than total health expenditures in eleven heavily indebted coun-
tries between 2000 and 2005.
 
 
Graph 1: Total debt servicing and total education expenditures, in  
USD millions, 2000–2005.59
 
Graph 2: Total debt servicing and total health expenditures, in  
USD millions, 2000–2005.60
While the CESCR has not set specific benchmarks or indi-
cators on the level of expenditures that States Parties should 
devote to ensure minimum essential levels of a particular right, 
it categorically stated that an “insufficient expenditure or misal-
location of public resources which results in the non-enjoyment 
of [a particular] right” is a violation of obligations under the 
ICESCR.61 Developed and developing countries have the obli-
gation to devote sufficient resources towards the realization of 
ESC rights. Consequently, the CESCR criticized Canada for 
allocating insufficient funds towards the right to adequate hous-
ing.62 As for measuring the sufficiency of financial resources, 
Robertson suggested developing ratios that compare ICESCR 
expenditures with expenditures that cannot claim priority over 
ICESCR rights.63 Robertson concluded such comparisons on 
government spending will lead to greater insight as to whether 
a State Party has devoted its maximum available resources to 
ESC rights.64
RetROgRessive measuRes as Prima Facie viOlatiOns Of 
tHe icescR anD DeBt seRvicing
A third and separate obligation is for State Parties to avoid 
retrogressive measures that will hinder or halt the continuous 
improvement of ESC rights. Human right scholar Magdalena 
Sepulveda defined a deliberate retrogressive measure as any that 
“implies a step back in the level of protection accorded to the 
rights contained in the Covenant which is the consequence of an 
intentional decision by the State.”65 The obligation with respect 
to retrogressive measures is a negative duty, or an obligation 
to refrain from committing certain acts that have the effect of 
impairing advancements in ESC rights.66
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The CESCR has criticized States Parties for their adoption 
of retrogressive measures. For example, in its Concluding 
Observation for Mauritius in 1994, the Committee stated its 
concern over the reintroduction of fees for tertiary educa-
tion, describing it as “a deliberate retrogressive step.”67 In 
addition, in its Concluding Observation for Nigeria in 1998, 
the Committee criticized the introduction of fees in primary 
schools, hospital charges,68 and skyrocketing university fees 
during the previous year.69
Insofar as retrogressive measures are limitations on rights, 
the ICESCR imposes an additional requirement that they 
should be “determined by law . . . and solely for the purpose 
of promoting the general welfare in a democratic society.”70 
In General Comment No. 13, the CESCR clarified the nature 
of retrogressive measures as prima facie violations of the 
ICESCR.71 A State Party adopting a retrogressive measure 
can overcome the presumption that such a measure is imper-
missible if it can prove three criteria: (1) the measure was 
introduced only as a last resort after carefully considering all 
alternatives; (2) it is fully justified “by reference to the total-
ity of the rights” in the ICESCR; and (3) it is fully justified 
“in the context of the full use of the State Party’s maximum 
available resources.”
The relationship between debt servicing and the adoption 
of retrogressive measures is an indirect one. Certain levels of 
debt servicing severely deplete a country’s resources, which 
then leads to the adoption of retrogressive measures, including 
inter alia, the imposition of certain fees on social services. For 
example, school fees and related costs are a hindrance to real-
izing the right to education for children in many countries. A 
2001 World Bank survey found that such fees are being levied 
in 77 out of 79 low-income countries.72 In countries without 
formal fees, the survey found that public schools imposed 
“informal fees” to make up for the lost revenue.73
While a decrease in government expenditures for a particular 
right is not a per se retrogressive measure, a sustained decrease 
is usually to the detriment of ICESCR rights. Moreover, the 
CESCR has frequently criticized States Parties when the propor-
tion of their expenditures for social services declines relative to 
its GDP.74 The Committee has also implied that a State Party may 
be in violation of its ICESCR obligations if it cannot adequately 
justify a reduced expenditure for a particular right.75 A researcher 
with wide experience in human rights law, Brigit Toebes, argued 
that “[g]iven the fact that Article 2(1) speaks of ‘progressive 
realization,’ a cut back in the expenses is difficult to justify and 
requires a heavy burden of proof on the part of States.”76
coNclusioNs aNd recommeNdatioNs:  
proposiNG aN iNterNatioNal deBt restructuriNG 
mechaNism that respects aNd promotes  
esc riGhts iN deBtor couNtries
Massive debt repayments undermine the capacity of the 
poorest debtor countries to perform their obligations under the 
ICESCR. First, a debtor country that diverts its resources to debt 
servicing and fails to use them optimally (“to the maximum”) 
to realize ESC rights violates the ICESCR. Second, when a 
debtor country fails to satisfy the minimum essential levels of 
these rights because debt repayments have drained its finances, 
it also violates the ICESCR. Third and finally, a debtor country 
that deliberately adopts a retrogressive measure in order to save 
and allocate more funds for debt repayments also breaches the 
Covenant. On the basis of their extraterritorial human rights 
obligations — a necessary offshoot of their duty of interna-
tional cooperation and assistance — creditor countries have a 
corresponding obligation not to undermine or frustrate debtor 
countries’ efforts to realize their peoples’ ESC rights. Creditor 
countries’ insistence on debt repayments, despite the clearly 
adverse impact on debtor countries’ ability to realize ESC rights, 
is legally incompatible with such a duty.
On the basis of their extraterritorial human rights 
obligations — a necessary offshoot of their duty of 
international cooperation and assistance — creditor 
countries have a corresponding obligation not to 
undermine or frustrate debtor countries’ efforts to realize 
their peoples’ ESC rights. Creditor countries’ insistence  
on debt repayments, despite the clearly adverse  
impact on debtor countries’ ability to realize ESC  
rights, is legally incompatible with such a duty. 
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Providing adequate debt relief to debt-distressed coun-
tries is one way creditor countries may observe their duty 
of international cooperation and assistance. The most recent 
expression of creditor countries’ adherence to this duty is the 
declaration of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).77 
Specifically, one MDG demands dealing comprehensively 
with the debt problems of developing countries through 
national and international measures to make debt more sus-
tainable in the long run. The Millennium Declaration reiter-
ates the need for creditor countries to engage in effective 
international cooperation through “a global partnership for 
development.”78 Renowned economist Jeffrey Sachs posits 
that such a global partnership requires tackling the poorest 
countries’ national debt through debt relief and cancellation.79 
Sachs’s point confirms the weakness of present mechanisms 
designed to solve the unsustainable level of developing coun-
tries’ external debts. Diffused and uncoordinated, the present 
mechanisms suffer from serious flaws, at least from the per-
spective of the peoples of debtor countries.80
In November 2009, the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) warned that developing 
countries’ debt burdens would increase by over seventeen 
percent in 2010.81 This debt burden, according to UNCTAD, 
has adverse effects on the economic growth of developing 
countries and jeopardizes their capacity to meet the MDGs. 
UNCTAD also warned of the negative impact of high debt 
burden on 49 least developed countries.82 This negative prog-
nosis was despite the debt restructuring mechanisms that have 
been in operation for years. For many debtor countries, incur-
ring unsustainable external debt is a chronic problem, and the 
existing mechanisms only offer palliative relief. The only logi-
cal conclusion is that such mechanisms are seriously deficient 
in achieving their main objectives — namely, to get a debtor 
country out of debt crisis and to prevent similar predicaments 
in the future.
Therefore, this article proposes the establishment of a new 
international debt restructuring mechanism that will compre-
hensively resolve the debtor countries’ repayment difficulties 
while, at the same time, respecting the state’s obligation to 
realize the ESC rights of its people. Reforming the external 
debt restructuring process for developing countries is not a 
novel idea; it has occupied public policy debates regarding 
sovereign lending and borrowing since the late 1970s, when 
the first symptoms of the debt overhang became manifest.83 
This article nevertheless continues the debate, highlighting the 
need to prioritize ESC rights in any future international debt 
restructuring mechanism.
Whatever form this new mechanism ultimately takes, it 
must be capable of remedying a debtor country’s unsustain-
able level of indebtedness in a timely, transparent, and fair 
manner. It is in the interest of all parties, but most crucial for 
a troubled debtor country, to immediately establish restructur-
ing terms that are aimed at sustainability and growth. It is also 
important that the restructuring process be transparent, most 
especially to the people of the debtor country. The existing 
debt restructuring mechanisms are non-transparent because 
only a limited group of officials from the debtor country’s 
finance ministry or central bank takes part in the process, 
excluding members of the legislature and other elected officials 
who are directly accountable to the people. Finally and perhaps 
most importantly, a fair international debt restructuring process 
must ensure that the taxpayers of a debtor country would only 
pay those debts that have actually redounded to their benefit. 
If the loaned money did not in fact reach them or, worse, was 
used to oppress them, then it would be the height of injustice to 
require them to repay it.
The ultimate aim of any debt restructuring is to make the 
burden sustainable in the long run,84 either through cancellation 
or reduction of a particular class of debts. Assessing the sustain-
able level of indebtedness is, therefore, crucial in any restructur-
ing process. Once ascertained, this level will help to determine 
the sufficient amount of debt relief and the reorganization plan 
most suited to the debtor country’s circumstances. This plan is 
successful if it allows a debtor country a “fresh start” similar 
to what domestic bankruptcy procedures provide individual or 
corporate debtors. Under the current mechanisms, debt sus-
tainability analysis is carried out exclusively by the creditors 
themselves, using an arbitrary formula and employing their own 
analysis of a debtor country’s economic condition.
Fair international debt restructuring mechanisms for devel-
oping countries ought to, rather, take into consideration other 
possible “evidence” of the level of debt that a debtor country can 
realistically sustain without sacrificing important ESC rights-
related expenditures. Such an important issue should not be left 
to the unfettered discretion of the creditors alone. While credi-
tors’ sustainability analyses should be one factor, they should 
not be the only assessments of a debtor country’s economic 
situation. To this end, debt sustainability analyses should ideally 
be performed by an independent body of experts, preferably a 
UN agency or some judicial bankruptcy court. At the very least, 
a proposed international debt restructuring mechanism ought to 
independently determine a debtor country’s level of sustainable 
debts after hearing and considering “evidence” presented by 
both the creditors and the debtor country.
An appropriate debt sustainability analysis should incorpo-
rate the need to prioritize ESC rights. Current mechanisms for 
debt restructuring do not take into account the public expendi-
tures needed to progressively realize the ESC rights of the debtor 
state’s population. In the IMF and World Bank HIPC Initiative, 
for example, a debtor country’s eligibility to receive debt relief 
is based on purely economic measures: it fixes a ratio of 150 
percent for a country’s debt-to-export levels or, if a country has 
an unusually high level of exports, a ratio of 250 percent for 
debt-to-government revenues.85 Critic Charles Mutasa observes 
that “[t]he HIPC [I]nitiative’s focus on purely economic criteria 
in assessing a country’s debt burden betrays an utter lack of 
concern for human development and for the capacity of poor 
countries to meet the needs of their own people.”86
Excluding ESC rights-related expenditures from debt sus-
tainability analyses has led to steep declines over time in public 
expenditures for services such as health and education. A new 
type of analysis is needed to determine the sustainable threshold 
of a debtor country’s debt stock by factoring in ESC rights-
related required expenditures. Similarly, Anne Pettifor argues 
that it is “necessary to develop reasonably precise principles for 
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determining levels of debt sustainability that are consistent 
with the protection of human rights.”87
This article proposes two appropriate guides to determine 
the amount of a debtor country’s resources that must be 
shielded from creditor claims. First, an insolvency mechanism 
that aggregates the resources a debtor country requires to meet 
the MDGs by 2015 would pin the financing needs of a debtor 
country to these goals. UNDP previously proposed a broader 
concept of debt sustainability that “satisfies the financial 
requirements for achieving a sustainable growth path neces-
sary for achieving the Millennium Development Goals.”88 
Because each debtor country has unique levels of develop-
ment and possesses different resources, these financing needs 
necessarily vary from country to country. Although this is an 
admittedly tedious task, it is not impossible. In fact, a previous 
study equated the sustainability of external debts with a debtor 
country’s ability to meet the MDGs, while continually being able 
to repay a reduced external debt stock.89
Second, an insolvency mechanism could aggregate the 
amount of resources that a debtor country would need to satisfy 
the minimum essential levels of each of the ESC rights. This 
option is more difficult because, as discussed above, there is 
no consensus on the minimum essential levels of each of the 
ESC rights. Whether the first or second suggestion is adopted, 
the basic idea is that either the MDGs or the minimum essential 
levels of ESC rights are more appropriate benchmarks in an 
independent debt sustainability analysis than purely economic 
measures, such as debt-to-export or debt-to-revenue ratios, uni-
formly applied to debtor countries regardless of their level of 
ESC rights’ realization.  HRB
